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PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION:  WHAT ARE THEY? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Psychology and religion would appear to be related in principle.   But religion does not 
feature largely in main-stream psychology.  Richards (1988) argues that the relationship 
has historically been closer than it is now, and Buchanan (2003) largely agrees.   A prior 
question, it is suggested, is what we do or should mean by the two terms.   Different types 
of definition are discussed, stipulative, reportive, essentialist and operational.   A special 
case of the last can be considered to be ’family resemblances’, characteristics shared in 
unequal measure by members of a class.   This seems most appropriate to religion, but the 
lists of most writers appear too short.   A longer set of characteristics is suggested.   But 
for psychology a lexical approach seems more helpful, an example being the author’s 
distinction between discipline, subject and profession.   These points suggest two entities 
which do have something in common, but which are in fact essentially different in 
significant ways affecting assumptions, content, methodology and modes of thought.   
Nevertheless psychology should engage with religion.   Some reasons why it has not 
done so more completely are discussed.   There are currently signs of a more 
comprehensive approach. 
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PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION:  WHAT ARE THEY? 
 
 
 
Some may remember that programme from the hey-day of radio, The Brains Trust, and 
the philosopher Dr C E M Joad’s seemingly perennial phrase, ‘It all depends on what you 
mean’.  In psychology, this really is very often the case (for example, with intelligence, 
Radford 1995), and perhaps especially when two things are to be compared or contrasted.   
It might seem obvious that psychology and religion are two such things.   Psychology is 
generally defined, at least in textbooks, as ‘the study of human experience and 
behaviour’, or something like that.   Religion is clearly, at the very least, an important 
component of these.   Yet it hardly features in general textbooks.   I have recently 
reviewed two major British examples (Davey, 2004;  Hewstone, Fincham and Foster, 
2005).   ‘Religion’ does not appear in the index of either.   Graham Richards (1998) 
discusses the historical relationship of psychology and religion.   He argues that this 
relationship has in the past been closer in various ways than is accepted now, and indeed 
that we cannot fully understand the development of modern western psychology without 
taking the interaction into account, and Trey Buchanan (2003) broadly agrees.   There 
are, of course, many more specialized publications treating either religion from a 
psychological point of view, or vice versa.  Nevertheless I wish to suggest that a prior 
question, not fully explored, is what we do or should mean by these two terms. 
 
Defining religion and psychology 
Both Richards and Buchanan, and many other authors of course, do say what they mean 
by the two terms.   On the other hand some, such as Parsons and Jonte-Pace (2001), 
introducing a book on Psychology and Religion:  Mapping the Terrain, leave both terms 
quite undefined.    Where definitions are offered, psychology is generally treated briefly 
as above.  Richards (1987) has made the distinction between (upper case) Psychology the 
discipline and (lower case) psychology the subject matter of that discipline, though this 
has not as yet been universally adopted.    Some definitions of religion (at least in relation 
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to psychology) are equally brief, for example Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975): ‘ … a 
system of beliefs in a divine or superhuman power, and practices of worship or other 
rituals directed at such a power’.   It is easy to think of exceptions, for example Zen 
Buddhism (or indeed original Buddhism as far as we know it), or scientology, though 
there is always the problem of circularity – exceptions are not ‘really’ examples. 
 
I shall not attempt to collate the numerous definitions that have been offered.   However, 
King (1995) argues that the very attempt to define religion, or identify distinctive 
qualities it possesses, has been primarily a Western concern, implying a concept of 
religion, and specifically of a creator deity, as something outside of, and fundamentally 
different from, our universe and ourselves.   In many other cultures, no distinction is seen 
between life as a whole and ‘religious’ sensibility and practice.   He does not deal with 
psychology, but an analogous point might be made, in respect of Psychology and ‘folk 
Psychology’. 
 
A problem with attempting definitions is that it does, indeed, rather depend on what you 
mean, by a definition.  Without attempting a philosophical analysis, there would be 
general agreement that there are different sorts of definition (Hospers, 1990;  Miles, 
1957).   These include:  stipulative, which one might call the Humpty Dumpty approach 
of stating what you intend a term to mean;  reportive or lexical, the dictionary account of 
what is in fact referred to by a particular language group;  essential, specifying one or 
more characteristics that constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the 
term;  and operational, which one might regard as an attempt to say what functions or as 
it were ‘counts’ as the thing in question.   A special case of this, it seems to me, is when 
there is not an exact match between different cases of what is being defined.   Rather, 
there are what have been termed ‘family resemblances’.   There is perhaps no single 
activity in which all ‘farmers’ engage, though all take some from a common list.  All of 
these sorts of definitions can be applied to both religion and psychology, but all have 
difficulties.   In the case of religion, taking a stipulative approach, A may include 
scientology while B excludes it.   There is a continuing debate over the differences, if 
any, between cults and religions (see e.g. Galanter, 1989).   The lexical approach dodges 
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any conceptual issues, while the essential tactic pre-empts them.   The most helpful line 
in the case of religion, it seems to me, is that of family resemblances.   This approach is 
familiar in anthropology.   Sperber (2004) states:  ‘Today, most anthropologists would 
agree that “religion” is a polythetic or ‘family resemblance’ notion under which it may 
be convenient to lump together a wide variety of related phenomena’.  Several authors, 
such as Brown (1988) and Alston (1967), give lists of components, a selection of which 
would feature in anything that might reasonably be called a religion.   Alston’s is one of 
the more comprehensive lists (slightly paraphrased).    
 
1. Belief in supernatural beings / gods 
2. A distinction between sacred and profane objects 
3. Ritual acts focused on sacred objects 
4. A moral code believed to be sanctioned by the gods 
5. Religious feelings, e.g. awe, mystery, guilt, adoration, connected in idea with the 
gods 
6. Prayer and other communication with the gods 
7. A world view including a sense of purpose and the place of the individual 
8. The organization of life based on the world view 
9. A social group bound together by the above. 
 
Even so, there are generally recognized religions, of which Zen Buddhism is perhaps the 
best example, that correspond only loosely to the above.   On the other hand, it seems to 
me that religions as they actually exist include several other components, and I suggest at 
least the following, which I think are distinct from each other and from the first nine. 
 
10. A doctrine or creed, more or less mandatory 
11. Sacrifice, real or symbolic 
12. A formal, ‘authorized’ priesthood 
13. Systems of retreat and pilgrimage 
14. A body of myth, legend, and real or supposed history 
15. Expression in the arts, buildings etc 
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16. Individual spiritual development 
17. Mystical and ecstatic experience 
18. Iconography, the representation and (for some) embodiment of deities 
19. A programme of ceremonies and festivals 
20. An organization and corporate body. 
 
Of course, many of these can and do also exist in a non-religious context, for example 
ecstatic experiences, ceremonies, retreats, morality and so on.   King (1995) however 
makes the important point that the religious versions are significant not necessarily due to 
differences in content or process, but because of their context of thought, discipline and 
value, in short their meaning.   One cannot simply equate (not King’s example) fasting 
for health reasons, as a political protest, and as a religious obligation, even if the 
behaviour is the same.   Nevertheless, a selection from some such list as the above is 
what we see when we look at a ‘religion’.   King himself gives eight ‘characteristics and 
structures of religious life’, namely (summarized):  traditionalism, myth and symbol, 
salvation, sacred places and objects, sacred actions (rituals), sacred writings or oral 
tradition, a sacred community, and the sacred experience.   Again, all these have secular 
counterparts, even if sometimes trivial (it is common to refer to a boss’s office as ‘the 
inner sanctum’).     
 
Psychology, as an entity, is much smaller and less variegated.   Religion is intimately 
bound up with human life in pretty well all its aspects, economic, social, political, 
geographical and so on (e.g. Park, 1994;  Westerlund, 1996).   At least 80% of the world 
population acknowledges a religious affiliation (www.adherents.com/Religions, April 
2005).  Of course in one sense psychology is even more widespread, inasmuch as it 
includes both psychology as subject matter and folk Psychology.   But in a formal sense, 
Psychology is the concern of a few thousand individuals, far from randomly drawn from 
the human race’s six billion. 
 
Nevertheless difficulties of definition arise.  The brief versions of introductory textbooks 
often fall short of all they are meant to, or ought to, include.  They are attempts at 
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‘essentialist’ definitions, which I have argued are inappropriate (Radford, 1992).  Others 
fall back on listing some of the many activities of psychologists (an operational 
definition).   In some countries Psychology is actually defined by law, at least in its 
professional aspects.   But it would not do to say, operationally, that Psychology is what 
Psychologists do.   That would exclude many other specialists who clearly deal with 
psychological matters.    It might be possible to make a list of components analogous to 
those for religion.   But it seems most unlikely that it would include any of the items 
listed above, except number 20.   Still less would there be anything corresponding to 
sacred meaning such as King specifies.   Further, there are manifestly many widely 
different religions, distinguished by doctrine, practice and assumptions (e.g. Esposito, 
Fasching and Lewis, 2002).   Possibly few would wish to say that there are distinct 
‘Psychologies’ in the same way.   I have argued, on the other hand, taking a lexical 
approach, that words such as ‘psychology’, ‘history’ or ‘physics’ each stands for several 
entities that are essentially different (Radford and Rose,1989;  Radford, 2004).   
Specifically, what I term discipline, subject and profession.   At the risk of repetition, by 
a discipline I mean a set of problems that seem to hang together, and their related 
methods and body of knowledge.  A discipline is not defined by a set of material.   Rather 
it has a focus, but no boundaries.   There is nothing that can be ruled out as irrelevant a 
priori.   Nor can any methods of investigation.   By a subject I mean a selection of 
material for purposes of dissemination or presentation, for example for teaching or 
writing.   By a profession I mean a body of people, formally or informally organized and 
qualified, who apply or explore the discipline.  Both a subject and a profession have 
territorial aspects.   Just what practitioners are empowered to do, and what material goes 
into texts or syllabuses, are legitimate concerns.    But any such limitations on a discipline 
would be absurd, a retreat to censorship of enquiry. 
 
This analysis can only to a small extent be applied to religion.   Religion can be treated as 
a subject, whether as doctrine or more objectively as comparative religion.   Many people 
are qualified and organized to practice it, and for them religion may be said to be their 
profession.   But the majority of followers of a religion are not like this.   One could 
hardly say that a religion, or Religion in general, is either a subject or a profession, 
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though it has aspects of both.  With a discipline, it is still more debatable.   It would 
surely be generally agreed, as suggested at the start, that the problems on which 
Psychology focuses are those of human thought and behaviour, or some such phrase.  
(This is a lexical definition, it is what the label indicates.)   It is much harder to find a 
generally applicable phrase in the case of religion.  Hyde (1990) discusses various 
attempts to do so.  The discipline of History is the study of the events of the past (strictly, 
recorded events), that is, history.   It would be odd to say that Religion is the study of 
religion (and neither is Theology).   Nor are there agreed methods, and still less an agreed 
body of knowledge.   Some religions, at least, attempt to restrict enquiry, sometimes with 
violence.   Censorship and heresy are the antithesis of a discipline, as I conceive it.  Thus 
one can hardly characterize Religion as a discipline.    
 
Comparing psychology and religion 
We seem to have two somewhat disparate conglomerations or collections, to which I 
might refer as (R) and (P) respectively, the ( ) representing, if you will, two loose corrals.   
Certainly some of the specimens in one resemble some of those in the other.   Whether 
they are the same species, however, is not always clear.   For example, can psychotherapy 
from a religious standpoint really be equivalent to a non-religious approach?  (see 
Bhugra, 1996).    The most ambivalent case is perhaps that of psychoanalysis.   Although 
Freud was trained as, and always insisted that he remained, a scientist, his system has 
often been compared to a religion, mainly on the following grounds.   There is an obvious 
analogy between the analytic session and the confessional (with fees as penance).   There 
is admission to the profession by a form of acceptance of doctrine, the training analysis.   
There is validation by individual experience.   Freud remarked that his theories were 
tested on the couch.  This can be taken to mean that the therapist observes the results 
there (although seldom very systematically or objectively);  but also that what really 
matters is what the patient feels to have happened, that is to say individual experience.  
This is the bedrock of most if not all religions.  ‘Insight’ would appear to be of the same 
order of phenomena as ‘enlightenment’ or ‘revelation’.  And there is the suspicion that 
psychoanalysis is a system in which it is necessary to ‘believe’ in a more religious than 
scientific manner, and that in fact new psychoanalyst is (in some respects) but old priest 
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writ large.   There are also cases, such as scientology,  which seem to fall partly into both 
camps, but which the majority of members of both disown.   
 
In other ways there appear to be significant differences.   Richards (1998) says that ‘Both 
Psychology and religion tackle the “big questions” and claim professional expertise in the 
“cure of souls”’.   But many Psychologists do not think that souls, in any religious sense, 
even exist.   A big question, I suppose, might be why people commit acts of evil.   
Different kinds of answers are found in (R) and (P) respectively.   Limiting ourselves to 
Christianity, the most salient form of religion for western Psychology, evil is indissolubly 
linked to original sin.   This doctrine does not merely mean that all humans have the 
potential for evil, but that they actually are sinful by nature, regardless of what they do.   
Keith Ward (1998), Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, holds that the doctrine ‘is a 
profound analysis of the human condition, and it is quite compatible with the evolutionist 
account of human biological origins’.   I don’t know of any evidence from Psychology, or 
indeed any other human science, to support this.   On the contrary, it is beyond 
reasonable doubt that humans are born with a range of potentials for good and bad, which 
vary between individuals and develop variously in interaction with environmental factors.   
Much of this is well established in ample detail.   Now, it is not just that contrary 
opinions emanate from (R) and (P).   It is a different kind of answer, based on different 
kinds of grounds.   The psychological answer is based, as far as possible, on objective 
evidence carefully gathered and open to refutation.  That remains broadly the standpoint 
of Psychology as a discipline, despite various critical views (e.g. Fox and Prilleltensky, 
1997).   The religious answer is given, and remains true whether evidence supports it or 
not.   Ward’s argument is based on the Genesis account, which he says is now taken as 
symbolic rather than literal.   But he still thinks the doctrine is a true description.   And 
some, of course, do take Genesis quite literally. 
 
This raises complex questions, which can only be illustrated here (see Wulff, 1997).   
Some theologians and some scientists argue that science and religion are compatible.     
One line is that religion, like science, is based on evidence, and open to change in the 
light of it.   Another is that, contrariwise, science itself involves belief just as religion 
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does.   For example, John Bowker (2002) says that science progressively changes and 
develops, as Newton’s ideas were modified by Einstein.   In the same way, he says, 
traditionally God was always referred to as male, but now this is not so.   The simple 
problem would seem to be, that there are no better or worse grounds for referring to God 
as male or female or neuter or unknown now than there have ever been, in other words 
none at all.   (To say nothing of the numerous Goddesses the human race has conceived 
of.)  Newton’s and Einstein’s views can be tested by observation.   This does not mean, in 
itself, that it is meaningless to talk about God, and in order to do so one has to use some 
pronoun.   It does mean, it seems to me, that the two ways of thinking are incompatible.   
Again, Alister McGrath (1988, quoting Griffith-Thomas, 1930) argues that religious 
conviction is based on evidence in the same way as scientific theory:  faith ‘commences 
with the conviction of the mind based on adequate evidence’.   McGrath, a trained 
scientist, is also an ordained Anglican priest.   As such, he must believe, as his Church’s 
Synod recently confirmed, in the divine conception of Christ, and his resurrection.   The 
historical evidence for these resides in the New Testament accounts;  there is no 
independent corroboration.   Both events are commonplaces of myth, and the accounts 
were derived from oral tradition many years later.   The point, however, is not that this 
would not appear to many historians to be ‘adequate evidence’.   It is that it must be 
believed regardless of the evidence.   This is made explicit in authoritative 
pronouncements such as that of the Catholic Encyclopaedia, which states: ‘there is a two-
fold order of knowledge … in one we know by natural reason, the object of the other is 
mysteries hidden in God, but which we have to believe and which can only be known to 
us by Divine revelation’ (www.newadvent.org/cathen/, April 2005) .    
 
Conversely, some creationists hold that evolution is ‘only a theory’, for which there is no 
evidence, and that belief in it is therefore an act of faith.  One believes in Darwin, or one 
believes in the Bible.  (Since the latter is the word of God, the decision is simple.   And 
that also disposes of the scores of other creation myths which might seem to have an 
equal claim.)   More seriously, Mendel Sachs (1976), for example, argues that scientists 
have ‘faith’ at least in ‘a total order underlying all the manifestations of the material 
world’, which cannot be proved.   It appears to me that such a ‘faith’, if scientists do 
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indeed hold it, is more in the nature of an assumption, or a hope, rather than a certainty 
based on revelation.   Psychologists and other scientists assume that their subject matter 
does not behave completely at random.   The assumption is supported by the observation 
that if it did, there could be no practical applications of scientific knowledge, which there 
manifestly are.   I don’t claim that these ways of thinking are necessarily true of all 
religions or religious persons, merely that their acceptance differentiates religious and 
scientific thought. 
 
The relationship of psychology and religion 
‘Know then thyself, presume not God to scan: / The proper study of mankind is man’, said 
Pope, but he took for granted the reality of a deity.   For those who do not, everything in 
(R) must be considered as human behaviour, and thus the proper study of Psychology, as 
well as of other human sciences.   (Of course if God does exist, he she or it must be an 
important factor in human behaviour, and thus equally worthy of Psychological 
attention.)   (R) is close to the focus of psychology, and should be studied by 
Psychologists.   On the other hand, there would appear to be a disjunction between main-
stream scientific Psychology and personal belief in religion.  Of course there are 
Psychologists who are religious believers, although many fewer than in the general 
population (Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 1997).   As Graham Richards points out, they 
adopt one of several attitudes.   Some merely ignore or deny any discrepancy.  Hood et al. 
(1996) begin their textbook The Psychology of Religion by stating:  ‘…Psychologists 
have no calling to challenge religious institutions and their doctrines … it is not our 
place to question revelation or scripture’.   But it is difficult to see how this can be 
avoided when behaviour is directly affected.   Most psychiatrists, indeed most people, 
would make a clear distinction between hearing voices when there are, or are not, other 
people actually speaking to one.   Parents who spare not the rod because the Book of 
Leviticus so commands might well find themselves charged with child abuse, and a 
Psychologist might be called as an expert witness.   
 
Others take the two as separate ‘domains’, perhaps dealing with different problems 
and/or giving different sorts of answers.   The concept of a domain implies a territory or 
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area, distinct from others.   I think this is inappropriate for a discipline, and some might 
well feel it is not appropriate either for a religion, or Religion in general.   Argyle (2000), 
for example, argues that beliefs about religion are unlike beliefs about the physical world.   
They ‘are not verifiable in the same way, they are couched in symbols and myths … they 
are really attitudes which are expressed by images, using certain metaphors and 
accompanied by certain emotions’.   But for many religions this view would be clearly 
heretical, since they insist on the literal truth of their beliefs.  Of course such beliefs and 
attitudes can be, and are, studied by Psychologists.  And again, the question of how far 
attitudes correspond to reality cannot be entirely avoided.  Another version of the ‘two 
domains’ line is  ‘science asks how, religion asks why’.   But as a Psychologist, it is 
precisely why people behave as they do that I wish to discover.   I suggest the difference 
here is rather, what sort of answer satisfies the enquirer (see Richards, 2005).  I find an 
account in terms of heredity and environment satisfactory in principle;  believers do not.   
 
Yet another variation is that ‘there is more than one sort of knowledge’.   This is more 
sophisticated.   It could be taken in various ways.   One would refer to implicit 
knowledge such as skills, another to subjective experiences, feelings, attitudes etc.  This 
really depends, once again, on what you mean by ‘knowledge’.   But in any case, such 
matters are subject to psychological enquiry and explanation whether they are religious or 
not.   Stronger claims for uniquely religious knowledge might apply to ecstatic or 
mystical experiences, the attainment of which is often seen as the culmination of religious 
life (Marcoulesco, 1995).   Numerous accounts of ‘mystical union’ or the like stress its 
qualities of absolute conviction and of clear (even if inexpressible), and direct or 
immediate, knowledge.   The problem is that this knowledge seems to be by its very 
nature private.   As William James put it, ‘The incommunicableness of the transport is the 
keynote of all mysticism.   Mystical truth exists for the individual who had the transport, 
but for no one else’ (James, 1902).   Of course all subjective experience is in the last 
resort private, but if it is taken as a distinct form of knowledge this would appear to be 
inaccessible.    Nor is it an infallible source of knowledge.   One need not doubt that the 
mystic has had a profound experience, but it is difficult to see how Psychology, taken as 
at attempt at objective, verifiable science, can accommodate such claimed direct, personal 
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knowledge of reality, as opposed to reports of such experiences.   It is hard to reconcile 
‘direct’ experience with the psychological fact that experience is mediated by the senses 
and nervous system.   ‘Mystical’ or similar experiences are widely reported in all 
cultures.   They are variously attributed according to the norms of each culture.  There is 
besides considerable doubt as to whether the various experiences are equivalent.   
Yandell (1993) distinguishes ‘at least’ five distinct types.   And their status as evidence is 
highly questionable (Hepburn, 1967). 
 
The boundaries between ‘domains’ may shift as psychological knowledge impinges on 
matters of faith, rather as the Catholic Church eventually acknowledged that it was not 
crucial to hold that the earth is the centre of the universe (and has just recently 
pronounced that the Bible is not necessarily to be taken literally).  The process of 
adaptation is made easier for many by the current ‘pick and mix’ approach to personal 
beliefs that has developed (Wulff, 1997).   Furthermore, the concept of two domains may 
not apply to all religions.   In Christianity it goes back to the distinction between civil and 
canon law.  Indeed in essence it goes back to the very beginning:  ‘Render therefore unto 
Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s’ (Matthew 
22:21).   But Islam (for example) admits no such distinction:  ‘… we cannot have a 
philosophy or an educational policy which is based on a concept not identical with the 
Islamic’ (al-Attas, 1979).   There are two sources of knowledge, science and revelation, 
and in case of conflict the latter is always supreme.   As mentioned above, in other 
cultures religion is not seen as a domain separate from the rest of life at all.  What I wish 
to draw out is that what I have labelled (R) and (P) are entities of basically different 
types, and the relationship between them cannot be symmetrical.    
 
The Psychological study of religion 
Psychologists should certainly study religion.  It cannot but be a massively important part 
of their subject matter.   Religion is currently changing (as it always has done) but it is 
unlikely to disappear in the short term, as thinkers of the Enlightenment may have 
concluded.  David Fontana (2003) suggests four reasons for a relative lack of activity.   
First, religion and spirituality appear to some to be contrary to the teachings of science 
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and to a materialist / reductionist philosophy.  I have suggested that some features of 
religion are incompatible with science, but this is not a valid reason for not examining 
religion as a phenomenon.   I would also repeat the point made earlier, that many of the 
components of religion that I proposed, such as systems of morality, and indeed 
spirituality, exist in their own right, and are not intrinsically religious (see Holloway, 
1999).   Second, some religions have opposed scientific advances.   There is currently a 
resurgence of this with the very active propagation of so-called ‘scientific creationism’ 
and similar notions.  The rise of ‘fundamentalism’ is well documented (e.g. Almond, 
Appleby  and Swan, 2003).   All the more reason for Psychologists to be involved.   
Third, the Psychologist of religion needs a  knowledge of not only Psychology but of 
many other disciplines concerned with history, philosophy, anthropology, creative arts, 
etc.   But this in my view is true of all ideal Psychologists.   Fourth, there are major 
methodological problems, for example (as above) in the study of inner experience, which 
is often seen as the core of religion.   Difficult as it is, Psychologists should neither deny 
nor ignore such experience.   But as I have suggested, there is a difference between 
accepting the reality of experience, and accepting what the experience is said, by the 
experiencer or others, to be of.   Most if not all people have a convincing experience of 
seeing the moon as larger on the horizon than at the zenith, even though we are sure both 
the object and the image remain identical.   Another problem with religious mystical or 
ecstatic experience is that it is typically both rare and usually fleeting, though often with 
long-lasting effects.   However, ‘difficult’ is not the same as ‘impossible’. 
 
There are, I believe (in a non-religious sense), signs of the outline of a more 
comprehensive account of religion in terms of the human sciences.   It will be based, as 
all such accounts must be, on integrating physiological, individual and social factors, as I 
am not alone in suggesting (e.g. Runciman, 2005), indeed the concept goes back at least 
to Thomas Hobbes.   The term ‘bio-psycho-social’ has appeared.  This is not the place to 
explore current work on ‘neurotheology’, genetics, evolutionary psychology, parental 
influences and many other areas which will contribute.   The question of compatibility 
remains.   I have suggested some contraindications, but other views are many.   The late 
Pope John Paul II pronounced that ‘Science can purify religion from error and 
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superstition;  religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutism’ (1988, 
quoted by Mooney, 1996).   But Psychologists, I hope, would reject both. 
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